ব্যবহারকারী:সুমিত রায়/খেলাঘর

দর্শনে, নেচারালিজম বা প্রকৃতিবাদ বা স্বাভাবিকতা হল "একটি ধারণা বা মতবাদ যা অনুসারে কেবলমাত্র প্রাকৃতিক নিয়ম এবং বলই (অতিপ্রাকৃতিক অথবা আধ্যাত্মিক নয়) জগৎকে পরিচালিত করতে পারে।" প্রকৃতিবাদকে ধারণকারী অর্থাৎ নেচারালিস্ট বা প্রকৃতিবাদীগণ বলেন, প্রাকৃতিক নিয়মগুলোই সেই নিয়ম যা প্রাকৃতিক মহাবিশ্বের গঠন ও আচরণকে নিয়ন্ত্রণ করে এবং পরিবর্তিত মহাবিশ্বের প্রতিটি ধাপই এই নিয়মগুলোর ফলাফল।

"প্রকৃতিবাদকে সজ্ঞানগতভাবেই একটি অন্টোলজিভিত্তিক উপাদান এবং একটি পদ্ধতিগত উপাদানে ভাগ করা যেতে পারে।" অন্টোলজি বলতে সেই দার্শনিক শাখাকে বোঝায় যা বাস্তবতার প্রকৃতি নিয়ে আলোচনা করে। কিছু দার্শনিক প্রকৃতিবাদকে বস্তুবাদের সমার্থক দাবী করেন। যেমন, দার্শনিক পল কার্টজ বলেন, প্রকৃতিকে বস্তুর নীতি দিয়েই সবচেয়ে ভালভাবে ব্যাখ্যা করা যায়। এই নীতিগুলোর মধ্যে আছে ভর, শক্তি এবং সায়েন্স কমিউনিটি দ্বারা স্বীকৃত ভৌত ও রাসায়নিক ধর্মগুলো। আবার, প্রকৃতিবাদের এই ধারণাটি বলে, আত্মা, ডেইটি এবং ভূতরা সত্য নয় এবং প্রকৃতিতে এসবের কোণ "উদ্দেশ্য" নেই। এরকম প্রকৃতিবাদের প্রতি চূড়ান্ত বিশ্বাসকে সাধারণভাবে মেটাফিজিকাল নেচারালিজম বা অধিবিদ্যীয় প্রকৃতিবাদ বলা হয়।

প্রকৃতিবাদকে

Assuming naturalism in working methods is the current paradigm, without the unfounded consideration of naturalism as an absolute truth with philosophical entailment, called methodological naturalism. The subject matter here is a philosophy of acquiring knowledge based on an assumed paradigm.

With the exception of pantheists—who believe that Nature and God are one and the same thing—theists challenge the idea that nature contains all of reality. According to some theists, natural laws may be viewed as so-called secondary causes of god(s).

In the 20th century, Willard Van Orman Quine, George Santayana, and other philosophers argued that the success of naturalism in science meant that scientific methods should also be used in philosophy. Science and philosophy are said to form a continuum, according to this view.

Origins and history

The ideas and assumptions of philosophical naturalism were first seen in the works of the Ionian School pre-Socratic philosophers. One such was Thales, considered to be the father of science, as he was the first to give explanations of natural events without the use of supernatural causes. These early philosophers subscribed to principles of empirical investigation that strikingly anticipate naturalism.

Naturalism, in classical Indian philosophies, was the foundation of two (Vaisheshika, Nyaya) of six orthodox schools and one (Carvaka) heterodox school of Hinduism. The Vaisheshika school is traced to 2nd century BCE.

The modern emphasis in methodological naturalism primarily originated in the ideas of medieval scholastic thinkers during the Renaissance of the 12th century:

By the late Middle Ages the search for natural causes had come to typify the work of Christian natural philosophers. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric Jean Buridan (a. 1295-ca. 1358), described as "perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages," contrasted the philosopher's search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk's habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320–82), who went on to become a Roman Catholic bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, "there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us."

Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called secondary causes that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her."

During the Enlightenment, a number of philosophers including Francis Bacon and Voltaire outlined the philosophical justifications for removing appeal to supernatural forces from investigation of the natural world. Subsequent scientific revolutions would offer modes of explanation not inherently theistic for biology, geology, physics, and other natural sciences.

Pierre Simon de Laplace, when asked about the lack of mention of intervention by God in his work on celestial mechanics, is said to have replied, "I had no need of that hypothesis."

According to Steven Schafersman, president of Texas Citizens for Science, an advocacy group opposing creationism in public schools, the progressive adoption of methodological naturalism—and later of metaphysical naturalism—followed the advances of science and the increase of its explanatory power. These advances also caused the diffusion of positions associated with metaphysical naturalism, such as existentialism.

The current usage of the term naturalism "derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed 'naturalists' from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars." For them nature is the only reality. There is no such thing as 'supernatural'. The scientific method is to be used to investigate all reality, including the human spirit: "So understood, 'naturalism' is not a particularly informative term... The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily... reject 'supernatural' entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the 'human spirit'."

Etymology

The term "methodological naturalism" for this approach is much more recent. According to Ronald Numbers, it was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, a Wheaton College philosopher. De Vries distinguished between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God." The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by Edgar S. Brightman in an article in The Philosophical Review as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.

Metaphysical naturalism

মূল নিবন্ধ: Metaphysical naturalism

Metaphysical naturalism, also called "ontological naturalism" and "philosophical naturalism", is a philosophical worldview and belief system that holds that there is nothing but natural elements, principles, and relations of the kind studied by the natural sciences, i.e., those required to understand our physical environment by mathematical modeling. Methodological naturalism, on the other hand, refers exclusively to the methodology of science, for which metaphysical naturalism provides only one possible ontological foundation.

Metaphysical naturalism holds that all properties related to consciousness and the mind are reducible to, or supervene upon, nature. Broadly, the corresponding theological perspective is religious naturalism or spiritual naturalism. More specifically, metaphysical naturalism rejects the supernatural concepts and explanations that are part of many religions.

Methodological naturalism

Methodological naturalism does not concerned itself with claims about what exists, but with methods of learning what nature is. It attempts to explain and test scientific endeavors, hypotheses, and events with reference to natural causes and events. This second sense of the term "naturalism" seeks to provide a framework within which to conduct the scientific study of the laws of nature. Methodological naturalism is a way of acquiring knowledge. It is a distinct system of thought concerned with a cognitive approach to reality, and is thus a philosophy of knowledge. Studies by sociologist Elaine Ecklund suggest that religious scientists in practice apply methodological naturalism. They report that their religious beliefs affect the way they think about the implications - often moral - of their work, but not the way they practice science.

In a series of articles and books from 1996 onward, Robert T. Pennock wrote using the term "methodological naturalism" to clarify that the scientific method confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and is not based on dogmatic metaphysical naturalism (as claimed by creationists and proponents of intelligent design, in particular by Phillip E. Johnson). Pennock's testimony as an expert witness at the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial was cited by the Judge in his Memorandum Opinion concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a 'ground rule' of science today":

"Expert testimony reveals that since the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, science has been limited to the search for natural causes to explain natural phenomena.... While supernatural explanations may be important and have merit, they are not part of science." Methodological naturalism is thus "a paradigm of science." It is a "ground rule" that "requires scientists to seek explanations in the world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify."

Views

Alvin Plantinga

Alvin Plantinga, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Notre Dame, and a Christian, has become a well-known critic of naturalism. He suggests, in his evolutionary argument against naturalism, that the probability that evolution has produced humans with reliable true beliefs, is low or inscrutable, unless their evolution was guided (for example, by God). According to David Kahan of the University of Glasgow, in order to understand how beliefs are warranted, a justification must be found in the context of supernatural theism, as in Plantinga's epistemology. (See also supernormal stimuli).

Plantinga argues that together, naturalism and evolution provide an insurmountable "defeater for the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable", i.e., a skeptical argument along the lines of Descartes' Evil demon or Brain in a vat.

Take philosophical naturalism to be the belief that there aren't any supernatural entities - no such person as God, for example, but also no other supernatural entities, and nothing at all like God. My claim was that naturalism and contemporary evolutionary theory are at serious odds with one another - and this despite the fact that the latter is ordinarily thought to be one of the main pillars supporting the edifice of the former. (Of course I am not attacking the theory of evolution, or anything in that neighborhood; I am instead attacking the conjunction of naturalism with the view that human beings have evolved in that way. I see no similar problems with the conjunction of theism and the idea that human beings have evolved in the way contemporary evolutionary science suggests.) More particularly, I argued that the conjunction of naturalism with the belief that we human beings have evolved in conformity with current evolutionary doctrine... is in a certain interesting way self-defeating or self-referentially incoherent.

— Alvin Plantinga, Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, "Introduction"

Robert T. Pennock

Robert T. Pennock contends that as supernatural agents and powers "are above and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers" and "are not constrained by natural laws", only logical impossibilities constrain what a supernatural agent could not do. He states: "If we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers, then, by definition, they would not be supernatural". As the supernatural is necessarily a mystery to us, it can provide no grounds on which to judge scientific models. "Experimentation requires observation and control of the variables.... But by definition we have no control over supernatural entities or forces." Science does not deal with meanings; the closed system of scientific reasoning cannot be used to define itself. Allowing science to appeal to untestable supernatural powers would make the scientist's task meaningless, undermine the discipline that allows science to make progress, and "would be as profoundly unsatisfying as the ancient Greek playwright's reliance upon the deus ex machina to extract his hero from a difficult predicament."

Naturalism of this sort says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of the supernatural, which by this definition is beyond natural testing. As a practical consideration, the rejection of supernatural explanations would merely be pragmatic, thus it would nonetheless be possible, for an ontological supernaturalist to espouse and practice methodological naturalism. For example, scientists may believe in God while practicing methodological naturalism in their scientific work. This position does not preclude knowledge that is somehow connected to the supernatural. Generally however, anything that can be scientifically examined and explained would not be supernatural, simply by definition.

W. V. O. Quine

মূল নিবন্ধ: Naturalized epistemology

W. V. O. Quine describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. In his view, there is no better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first philosophy", such as (abstract) metaphysics or epistemology, that could stand behind and justify science or the scientific method.

Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own pursuit, while also feeling free to offer criticism when those claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In Quine's view, philosophy is "continuous with" science and both are empirical. Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds that science is the best way to explore the processes of the universe and that those processes are what modern science is striving to understand. However, this Quinean Replacement Naturalism finds relatively few supporters among philosophers.

Karl Popper

Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science. He rejected it based on his general critique of induction (see problem of induction), yet acknowledged its utility as means for inventing conjectures.

A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its value, no doubt.... I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of empirical method.

— Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (Routledge, 2002), pp. 52–53, ISBN 0-415-27844-9.

Popper instead proposed that science should adopt a methodology based on falsifiability for demarcation, because no number of experiments can ever prove a theory, but a single experiment can contradict one. Popper holds that scientific theories are characterized by falsifiability.

Tom Clark

Thomas W. (Tom) Clark created the website naturalism.org in 1998 "to raise awareness of worldview naturalism and its positive implications, and to develop and promote policies consistent with a naturalistic understanding of ourselves." Clark, a research associate at the Heller School for Social Policy and Management, argues that for atheists, "[u]nderstanding our full causal connection to the world engenders compassion and gives us greater practical control. The naturalistic view of ourselves thus has progressive, humanistic implications for interpersonal attitudes and social policy."

See also

• Daoism
• Deism
• Empiricism
• Epicureanism
• Hylomorphism
• Liberal naturalism
• Materialism
• Metaphysical naturalism
• Naturalistic pantheism
• Physicalism
• Religious naturalism
• Scientism
• Sociological naturalism
• Supernaturalism
• Alfred North Whitehead
• Vaisheshika
• Carvaka

References

• Audi, Robert (১৯৯৬)। "Naturalism"। Borchert, Donald M.। The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement। USA: Macmillan Reference। পৃষ্ঠা 372–374। উদ্ধৃতি টেমপ্লেট ইংরেজি প্যারামিটার ব্যবহার করেছে (link)
• Danto, Arthur C. (১৯৬৭)। "Naturalism"। Edwords, Paul। The Encyclopedia of Philosophy। New York: The Macmillan Co. and The Free Press। পৃষ্ঠা 448–450। উদ্ধৃতি টেমপ্লেট ইংরেজি প্যারামিটার ব্যবহার করেছে (link)
• Kurtz, Paul (১৯৯০)। Philosophical Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism। Prometheus Books। উদ্ধৃতি টেমপ্লেট ইংরেজি প্যারামিটার ব্যবহার করেছে (link)
• Lacey, Alan R. (১৯৯৫)। "Naturalism"। Honderich, Ted। The Oxford Companion to Philosophy। Oxford University Press। পৃষ্ঠা 604–606। উদ্ধৃতি টেমপ্লেট ইংরেজি প্যারামিটার ব্যবহার করেছে (link)
• Post, John F. (১৯৯৫)। "Naturalism"। Audi, Robert। The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy। Cambridge University Press। পৃষ্ঠা 517–518। উদ্ধৃতি টেমপ্লেট ইংরেজি প্যারামিটার ব্যবহার করেছে (link)
• Sagan, Carl (২০০২)। Cosmos। Random House। আইএসবিএন 978-0-375-50832-5। উদ্ধৃতি টেমপ্লেট ইংরেজি প্যারামিটার ব্যবহার করেছে (link)

Further reading

• Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (eds) Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004.
• Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (eds) Naturalism and Normativity. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
• Friedrich Albert Lange, The History of Materialism, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd, 1925, ISBN 0-415-22525-6
• David Macarthur, "Quinean Naturalism in Question," Philo. vol 11, no. 1 (2008).

External links

Supportive

• naturalism.org
• Naturalist Newsletter
• Center for Naturalism
• Naturalism: The Naturalistic Worldview
• Naturalism David Papineau, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• The Brights Illuminating and elevating the naturalistic worldview

Neutral

• Naturalism at PhilPapers
• স্ট্যানফোর্ড এনসাইক্লোপিডিয়া অফ ফিলোসফিতে "Naturalism" ভুক্তি
• Naturalism at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
• [naturali/ "Naturalism"] — বেনামী, ইন্টারনেট এনসাইক্লোপিডিয়া অফ ফিলোসফি, আইএসএসএন ২১৬১-০০০২, ৬ জুলাই ২০২৪।
• The Craig-Taylor Debate: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? William Lane Craig and Richard Taylor October 1993, Union College (Schenectady, New York)

Critical

• biologos.org
• "Naturalism" article in The Catholic Encyclopedia
• Alvin Plantinga (১৯৯৪)। "Naturalism Defeated" (পিডিএফ)। উদ্ধৃতি টেমপ্লেট ইংরেজি প্যারামিটার ব্যবহার করেছে (link) (pdf)
• A shorter version of C. S. Lewis' Dangerous Idea
• Philip Johnson's Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism from First Things
• Robert A. Delfino's (2007) Replacing Methodological Naturalism Metanexus Institute. Archived from the original.
• Robert A. Delfino's (2011) Scientific Naturalism and the Need for a Neutral Metaphysical Frameworkটেমপ্লেট:Metaphysics
  টেমপ্লেট:Philosophy of science