ব্যবহারকারী:HKChakladar/Aadhaar

বিন্যাস আধার কার্ড

পূর্ণ আধার কার্ড একটি রঙিন ডকুমেন্ট (হিসাবে উল্লেখ করা আধার চিঠি), প্রায়ই ছাপা, চকচকে, কাগজ, যে হয়, এছাড়াও সহজলভ্য বৈদ্যুতিন মাধ্যমে অনলাইন পিডিএফ. সরকারের মতে, একটি কালো এবং সাদা সংস্করণ নথি বৈধ নয়. , এটি ছাপা হয় A4 কাগজ এবং অর্ধেক গুটান প্রতিকৃতি (উত্পাদন করতে একটি সামনে ও পিছনে) যে প্রায় 93mm দ্বারা 215mm একবার মার্জিন মুছে ফেলা হয়. কিছু সংস্থা হতে পারে, লেমিনেটের মতো ফ্লোর কাভারিংস রিপ্লেস নথি চেয়ে আরো জন্য ₹30. এটি একটি কর্তক কার্ড আকারের অংশ নীচে সঙ্গে কী তথ্য. কিছু পৃথক সংস্থা উত্পাদন এবং চার্জ জন্য একটি পিভিসি কার্ড সংস্করণ (কাটা-বন্ধ নীচে অধ্যায়) মিথ্যাভাবে হিসাবে বিক্রী একটি স্মার্টকার্ড সাবধানতা সত্ত্বেও সরকারের কাছ থেকে.

1. শিরোনাম: ইউনিক আইডেন্টিফিকেশন অথরিটি অফ ইন্ডিয়া, ভারত সরকার. (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
2. কোন তালিকাভুক্তি
3. পূর্ণ নাম ধারক (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
4. এর নাম বাবা (বা স্বামী)
5. ঠিকানা
6. ফোন নম্বর
7. একটি পিডিএফ ইলেকট্রনিক স্বাক্ষর স্ব-স্বাক্ষরিত "ইউনিক আইডেন্টিফিকেশন অথরিটি অফ ইন্ডিয়া"
8. একটি QR কোড
9. ডাউনলোড, আপলোড এবং প্রজন্মের আপলোড
10. আধার কোন (রাষ্ট্রীয় ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
11. পিছন উপর প্রতীক প্রজাতন্ত্র, ভারত এবং লোগো এর আধার
12. সম্পর্কে সাধারণ তথ্য আধার কার্ড: (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
    • আধার একটি পরিচয় প্রমাণ নেই নাগরিকত্ব.
    • স্থাপন করা, পরিচয় প্রমাণীকরণ অনলাইন.
    • এই বৈদ্যুতিন উত্পন্ন চিঠি.
    • আধার বৈধ নয়, সারা দেশে.
    • আধার সহায়ক হতে হবে উপভোগের সরকার এবং অ-সরকারি সেবা ভবিষ্যতে.

1. সামনে শিরোনাম: ভারত সরকার (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি) সঙ্গে, প্রতীক
2. আলোকচিত্র ধারক
3. পূর্ণ নাম (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
4. জন্ম তারিখ (জাতীয় ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
5. লিঙ্গ (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
6. একটি QR কোড
7. আধার কোন (রাষ্ট্রীয় ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
8. রিয়ার শিরোনাম: ইউনিক আইডেন্টিফিকেশন অথরিটি অফ ইন্ডিয়া (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি) সঙ্গে লোগো
9. এর নাম বাবা (বা স্বামী)
10. ঠিকানা (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)
11. আধার সংখ্যা (রাষ্ট্র ভাষা এবং ইংরেজি)

1. UID - Aadhaar number
2. Full name of holder
3. Gender
4. Year of birth
5. Name of father (or husband)
6. Address
7. Full date of birth

1. The document of the card itself is electronic in PDF format,
2. A QR Code provides digital XML representation of some core details of the card.
3. The number and some limited details can be validated online (with the notable exclusion of the name),
4. Updating details can be done electronically using a mobile phone number and/or email as the second factor of authentication,
5. The system collects a photo, all 10 finger scans, and eye scan, however there is no known common usage of this data to date to electronically validate a holder.

Impediments and other concerns

Feasibility concerns

In October 2010, R. Ramakumar, an economist at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, wrote in an editorial for The Hindu that the project was being implemented without any cost-benefit or feasibility studies to ensure whether the project will meet its stipulated goals. He also pointed the government was obscuring the security aspects of Aadhaar and focusing on the social benefit schemes. He quoted former chief of the Intelligence Bureau Ajit Doval who had said that originally Aadhaar aimed to weed out illegal aliens.

In March 2011, Rajanish Dass of IIM Ahmedabad's Computer and Information Systems Group, published a paper titled "Unique Identity Project in India: A divine dream or a miscalculated heroism". Dass claimed that even if enrolment is voluntary, it is being made mandatory by indirect means. He pointed out that essential schemes like the National Food Security Act, 2013 was being linked to UIDAI. He also pointed the feasibility of a project of this size had not been studied and raised concerns about the quality of the biometric data being collected. He cited another researcher Usha Ramanathan that UIDAI will ultimately have to become profit-making to sustain itself.

On 9 November 2012, the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy published a paper titled A cost-benefit analysis of Aadhaar. The paper claimed that by 2015-16 the benefits of the project will surpass the costs, and by 2020-21 the total benefit would be ₹  ২৫১ বিলিয়ন (US$৫.০১ বিলিয়ন) against the total expenditure of ₹48.35 বিলিয়ন (US$৯৬৪.৫৮ মিলিয়ন). The benefits would come from plugging leakages in various subsidy and social benefit schemes.

In March 2016, the International Institute for Sustainable Development released a report that the benefit from Aadhaar-linked LPG subsidy scheme for 2014-15 was ₹১৪০ মিলিয়ন (US$২.৭৯ মিলিয়ন) and for 2015-16 was ₹1.209 বিলিয়ন (US$২৪.১২ মিলিয়ন). This sum was much lower than the number stated by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley in the Lok Sabha. He had said in March 2016 that the government had saved ₹  ১৫০ বিলিয়ন (US$২.৯৯ বিলিয়ন) from the scheme. The paper said that the government was also including the savings from the efforts of oil marketing companies (OMCs) prior to the introduction of Aadhaar. The method used by the OMCs to weed out duplicates and ghost customers was 15–20 times more effective than the Aadhaar-based method.

Lack of legislation and privacy concerns

In late November 2012, a former Karnataka High Court judge, Justice K. S. Puttaswamy, and a lawyer, Parvesh Khanna, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against the government in the Supreme Court of India. They had contended that government was implementing the project without any legislative backing. They pointed out that the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 which introduced in the Rajya Sabha was still pending. They said that since UIDAI was running on only an executive order issued on 28 January 2009, it cannot collect biometric data of citizens as it would be a violation of privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.

On 23 September 2013, the Supreme Court issued an interim order saying that "no person should suffer for not getting the Aadhaar card in spite of the authority making it mandatory". The court noted that the government had said that Aadhaar is voluntary.

On 2 February 2015, the Supreme Court asked the new government to clarify its stance on the project. This was in response to a new PIL filed by Mathew Thomas, a former army officer. Thomas had claimed that government was ignoring previous orders while pushing ahead with the project and that the project was unconstitutional as it allowed profiling of citizens. The government in a reply on 12 February said that it will continue the project. On 16 July 2015, the government requested the Supreme Court to revoke its order, saying that it intends to use Aadhaar for various services. On 21 July 2015, the Court noted that some states were insisting on Aadhaar for benefits despite its order.

On 11 August 2015, the Supreme Court directed the government to widely publicise in print and electronic media that Aadhaar is not mandatory for any welfare scheme. The Court also referred the petitions claiming Aadhaar is unconstitutional to a Constitutional Bench.

On 24 August 2017, the Supreme Court upholds right to privacy as a fundamental right. Supreme Court had ruled out it as a fundamental right under the Constitution. The nine-judge bench of the SC has unanimously held that privacy is a fundamental right.

Legality of sharing data with law enforcement

In 2013 Goa, the CBI was trying to solve the case of a rape of a schoolgirl. It approached a Goa local court saying that they had acquired some fingerprints from the scene and they could be matched with the UIDAI database. The court asked UIDAI to hand over all data of all persons in Goa to CBI.

The UIDAI appealed in the Bombay High Court saying that accepting such a request would set precedent for several more such requests. The High Court rejected the argument and on 26 February 2014 in an interim order directed Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) to study technological capability of the database to see if it can solve such a crime. The UIDAI then appealed in the Supreme Court. It argued that the chance of a false positive was 0.057% and with 600 million people in its database it would result in hundreds of thousands of false results.

The Supreme Court, on 24 March 2014, restrained the central government and the Unique Identification Authority of India from sharing data with any third party or agency, whether government or private, without the consent of the Aadhaar-holder in writing. Vide another interim order dated 16 March 2015, the Supreme Court of India has directed the Union of India and States and all their functionaries should adhere to the order passed by this court on 23 September 2013. It observed that some government agencies were still treating Aadhaar as mandatory and asked all agencies to issue notifications clarifying that it was not mandatory.

Land Allotment Dispute

In September 2013, the Delhi Development Authority accepted a complaint from the India Against Corruption activist group and cancelled a land allotment to UIDAI. The land was previously owned by BSNL, and MTNL had also laid claims on it. It was of an estimated ₹9 বিলিয়ন (US$১৭৯.৫৫ মিলিয়ন) value, but it had been allotted to UIDAI at a very cheap rate.

The issue of constructing UIDAI HQs and UIDAI Regional Office, Delhi's building was resolved with Department of Telecom (DoT). Following which, the Ministry of Urban Development has issued a notification on 21 May 2015 clearing the titles of the land in favour of UIDAI including land use.

Security concerns

In an August 2009 interview with the Tehelka, former chief of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Ajit Doval, said that it was originally intended to flush out illegal immigrants, but social security benefits were later added to avoid privacy concerns. In December 2011, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, led by Yashwant Sinha, rejected the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 and suggested modifications. It expressed objections to the issuing of Aadhaar numbers to illegal immigrants. The Committee said that the project was being implemented in an unplanned manner and by bypassing the Parliament.

In May 2013, deputy director general of UIDAI, Ashok Dalwai, admitted that there had been some errors in the registration process. Some people had received Aadhaar cards with wrong photographs or fingerprints. According to Aloke Tikku of Hindustan Times, some officials of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) had criticised the UIDAI project in September 2013. The unnamed IB officials have said that Aadhaar number cannot be treated as a credible proof of residence. As under the liberal pilot phase, where a person claims to live was accepted as the address and recorded.

Overlaps with National Population Register

The Aadhaar and the similar National Population Register (NPR) projects have been reported to be having conflicts. In January 2012, it was reported that UIDAI will share its data with NPR and NPR will continue to collect its own data. In January 2013, then Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde said that Aadhaar was not an identity card but a number, while NPR was necessary for national security purposes. The 2013 Supreme Court order did not affect the NPR project as it was not linked to any subsidy.

In July 2014, a meeting was held to discuss the possibility of merging the two projects Aadhaar and NPR, or making them complementary. The meeting was attended by Home Minister Rajnath Singh, Law and Justice and Telecom Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad and Minister of State for Planning Rao Inderjit Singh. However, later in the same month, Rao Inderjit Singh told the Lok Sabha that no plan to merge the two projects has been made.

Fraud

In order to make Aadhaar accessible to often undocumented poorer citizens, obtaining an Aadhaar card does not require significant documentation, with multiple options available. In theory, the use of biometric facilities should reduce or eliminate duplication. So, in theory while it may be possible to obtain the card under a false name, it is less likely to be able to obtain another Aadhaar card under a different (or real) name. There have been however cases where the biometrics requirements have been circumvented and potentially fraudulent Aadhaars have been issued.

The Aadhaar card itself is not a secure document (being printed on paper) and according to the agency should not be treated as an Identity card, nevertheless it is often treated as such, however with currently no practical way to validate the card (e.g. by Police at airport entry locations) it is of questionable utility as an Identity card. "There are five main components in an Aadhaar app transaction – the customer, the vendor, the app, the back-end validation software, and the Aadhaar system itself. There are also two main external concerns – the security of the data at rest on the phone and the security of the data in transit. At all seven points, the customer’s data is vulnerable to attack ... The app and validation software are insecure, the Aadhaar system itself is insecure, the network infrastructure is insecure, and the laws are inadequate." claims Bhairav Acharya, Program Fellow, New America.

The Aadhaar card is usually simply printed on glossy paper, and the government has stated black and white copies are valid. Some agencies charge extra to laminate the document. Other agencies have been reported charging ₹50 to 200 to produce a PVC version of the card, and it is marketed by them as a smart card, despite having no official validity and no chip.

Certain mobile apps claim to verify an Aadhaar card using a QR code scanner. However the QR code is not a secure representation of an Aadhaar card either and can be copied and edited. The only way to validate an Aadhaar card is to perform an online validation, that will confirm that the card number is valid, confirm the postal code and gender of the holder (but not their name or photo). In theory this means that is possible to create a false Aadhaar card using the number of a genuine holder from the same postal code with the same gender, with the card subject to a number of cases of counterfeiting.

The digital document itself is self-signed by a non-internationally recognised certificate authority (n)Code Solutions, a division of Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Company Ltd (GNFC) and needs to be manually installed on the PC. This is despite Entrust assisting on the development of the solution.

Application issues

While the service is free for citizens, some agents have been charging fees. Despite the modern processes there are cases where enrolments are lost in the system without explanation. mAadhaar is official mobile application developed by Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to provide an interface to Aadhaar Number Holders to carry their demographic information viz. Name, Date of Birth, Gender & Address along with photograph as linked with their Aadhaar Number in smart phones. It is strange a village in Haridwar shares the same birthday on Aadhaar cards In their Aadhaar card, an entire village shares their birth date as January 1

Exclusion

Documentary proof may be difficult to obtain, with the system requiring documents such as bank accounts, Insurance policies, driving licences etc. that themselves increasingly require an Aadhaar card to originate, or similar documentary evidence as an Aadhaar card. This may lead to a significant minority underclass of undocumented citizens who will find it harder to obtain necessary services. Introducers and Heads of family may also assist in documentation, however for many agencies and legitimate applications, this facility may not be practical.

Data Leaks

The amount of detailed personal information being collected is of extremely high importance to an individual. However once collected, it is not being treated with the required sensitivity of privacy concerns. Major financial transactions are linked with information collected in Aadhar. Data leaks are a gold mine for hackers and criminals who now use sophisticated hackers. Government department and various other agencies that collect this information, banks, etc. using this information cannot be trusted to maintain the secrecy with all this collected information. Another case wherein Aadhar data collected by Reliance Jio was leaked online, and may now be widely available with hackers. UIDAI confirms more than 200 government websites were publicly displaying confidential Aadhar data - though removed now, data leaked cannot be scrubbed from hackers database. On 2017 July the Aadhaar Card of privacy Issue was discussed at Supreme Court. A report from Center for Internet and Society suggests about 135million Indians records may have been leaked.

Wikileaks tweeted on August 25, 2017 that the same American supplier of fingerprint and Iris scanning equipment that collaborated with the CIA to identify Osama Bin Laden was also supplying equipment to India. The complex structure of ownerships is detailed in an article in Fountainink.in Concerns were raised way back in 2011 in Sunday Guardian regarding not following due process and handing over contracts to entities with links to FBI and having past history of leaking data across countries. How CIA can hack and access the Aadhar database using secret Expresslane project is documented in a report on GGInews website and saved in an archive lest it be forcefully removed. Further communications has also identified the clauses under which data may have freely flowed to foreign agencies due to the nature and wordings in the Aadhar contracts and archived here

References

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